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Abstract
Assignment games represent a tractable yet versatile model of two-
sided markets with transfers. We study the likely properties of the core
of randomly generated assignment games. If the joint productivities
of every firm and worker are i.i.d bounded random variables, then
with high probability all workers are paid roughly equal wages, and
all firms make similar profits. This implies that core allocations vary
significantly in balanced markets, but that there is core convergence
in even slightly unbalanced markets. For the benchmark case of uni-
form distribution, we provide a tight bound for the workers’ share of
the surplus under the firm-optimal core allocation. We present sim-
ulation results suggesting that the phenomena analyzed appear even
in medium-sized markets. Finally, we briefly discuss the effects of un-
bounded distributions and the ways in which they may affect wage
dispersion.
1 Introduction
The “law of one price” asserts that homogeneous goods must sell for the same
price across locations and vendors. In labor markets, it implies that workers
who are equally skilled should earn the same salary. This paper makes the
formal claim that even in the presence of some heterogeneity across firms and
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workers, an approximate law remains valid.1 While the law of one price does
not sit well with empirical evidence, our model provides a useful benchmark
for testing hypotheses on possible sources of wage inequality. Furthermore,
the analysis elucidates how surplus related to idiosyncratic compatibility is
divided among market participants.
Our basic building block is the assignment game model of Shapley and
Shubik (1971). Each firm from a finite set of firms F is looking to hire exactly
one worker from a finite set of workers W , in exchange for a negotiable salary.
Each firm has a (possibly different) value for hiring each of the workers, and
each worker has a (possibly different) reservation value for working for each
of the firms. Transfers are permitted between any two parties (not just a
transfer from a firm to a worker employed by it), and utility is assumed to be
linear in money. Note that since transfers are freely allowed, we can describe
the net productivity of each firm-worker pair by a single number.
We bolster the model by assuming that each element in the matrix of
productivities is independently and identically distributed on a bounded in-
terval. This assumption is similar in spirit to the one taken in many auction
theory papers, in which bidders’ valuations are assumed to be heterogeneous
and determined according to some random distribution. However, unlike
most of the literature on auction theory, we do not wish to study the effects
of the random generation on agents’ beliefs and equilibrium behavior. In-
stead we take a different approach and characterize the likely outcomes in a
typical complete information matching market created in that manner.
The main result of this paper is that under certain regularity conditions
and with high probability, in any core allocation workers are being paid
approximately identical salaries, and firms receive approximately identical
profits. Because of inherent heterogeneity in firms’ and workers’ preferences,
the law of one price only holds approximately, with some workers being paid
more than their peers. Nevertheless, the differences become negligible as the
market becomes large, and there is no wage dispersion in a reasonably-sized
random assignment game. Formally, we show that with high probability the
core of an assignment game generated by i.i.d draws from a bounded random
distribution with continuous and positive density is narrow, in the sense that
the difference between the payoffs of agents on the same side of the market
are O
(
log2(n)
n
)
.
1We choose to focus on labor markets as our main example. However, our results are
also applicable to markets with heterogeneous commodities and unit demand buyers.
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The approximate law of one price allows a deeper understanding of sur-
plus division between the two sides of the market. It was shown already by
Shapley and Shubik (1971) that there are core allocations which are optimal
for the firms, and core allocations that are optimal for the workers. In a
market with different number of firms and workers it is immediately implied
that agents on the long side will get a vanishing share of the total surplus.
However, in a balanced market the choice of core allocation can have com-
pelling consequences for all agents in the market. This extends the basic
economic intuition on competition in a market for homogeneous goods.
It is worthwhile to mention that the model can also be used to describe
auctions of heterogeneous items with unit-demand bidders Demange et al.
(1986). With this interpretation in mind, core allocations are equivalent
to Walrasian equilibira. Our results therefore provide insight into revenue
acquired by sellers under different market conditions.
From a slightly more broad point of view, this paper belongs to the the-
oretical literature on matching in two-sided markets. This literature gained
prominence in the 1960’s and early 1970’s following the publication of the
seminal papers by Gale and Shapley (1962) and Shapley and Shubik (1971),
yet research remained mostly divided (with some notable exceptions) into two
parallel strands: with and without transferable utility (i.e. money). During
the 1980’s, as it became clear that real-life centralized clearing houses can be
immensely improved using intuitions gained in the study of marriage mar-
kets, the transferable utility strand of the literature became slightly neglected
compared to its glorified non-transferable utility half-sibling. It is our be-
lief that assignment games provide an excellent way to model decentralized
markets, and that both strands of the matching theory literature can benefit
from the continuous cross-fertilization.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the liter-
ature related to our paper. Section 3 introduces the model and the formal
notation. Section 4 contains the statement and proof of the main result,
and Section 5 applies the result to analyze the likely properties of balanced
and unbalanced markets. Section 6 provides some simulation results and a
discussion on unbounded distribution, and Section 7 concludes.
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2 Related Work
Assignment games were introduced by Shapley (1955) and thoroughly ana-
lyzed by Shapley and Shubik (1971). A (non-comprehensive) list of further
work on assignment games includes the study of strategic incentives Demange
and Gale (1985), entry Mo (1988), convergence via decentralized processes
Chen et al. (2012); Klaus and Payot (2012); Nax et al. (2013), elongation
of the core Quint (1987) and its dimensions Nu´n˜ez and Rafels (2008), and
median stable matchings Schwarz and Yenmez (2011).
Analysis of random instances of the linear sum assignment problem was
first carried by Walkup (1979), and was subsequently improved by Aldous
(2001); Coppersmith and Sorkin (1999); Karp (1987). For a survey on the
topic and other related literature see Krokhmal and Pardalos (2009).
While to the best of our knowledge we are the first to introduce ran-
dom values into the assignment game framework, some of the consequences
we present in Section 5 resemble work done on random marriage markets.
Pioneered by Wilson (1972) and Knuth (1976), and extensively developed
by Pittel (1989, 1992), the analysis of random preference marriage markets
suggests that in a situation in which the number of men is equal to the
number of women, with high probability the proposing side’s (in a deferred
acceptance algorithm) mean rank of partners behaves like log(n), where as
the other side’s mean rank of partners behaves like n
log(n)
. Recently, Ashlagi
et al. (2013) have shown that in unbalanced random marriage markets with
high probability under any stable matching the short side’s mean rank of
partners behaves like log(n), whereas the long side’s mean rank of partners
behaves like n
log(n)
. Coles et al. (2014) and Coles and Shorrer (2014) utilize
those results to study aspects of strategic behavior in marriage markets with
incomplete information. The papers most closely related to the current pa-
per are Lee (2014) and Lee and Yariv (2014) that assume that preferences
are derived from underlying cardinal utilities and study the issues of core
convergence and efficiency, respectively. Finally, a different type of results
on random marriage markets (and extensions thereof) are related to show-
ing core convergence when preferences are bounded in length Ashlagi et al.
(2011); Immorlica and Mahdian (2005); Kojima and Pathak (2009); Kojima
et al. (2013).2
2Similar ideas were also applied by Manea (2009), Che and Kojima (2010) and Kojima
and Manea (2010).
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3 Model and Notation
Consider a sequence of markets {Mn}∞n=1, such that each market can be
described as Mn = (F n,W n, αn), where F n is a set of firms of size n, W n is
a set of workers of size n+k(n), with k(n) ≥ 0, and αn being an |F n|× |W n|
real matrix representing the value of pairs of firms and workers. We assume
throughout each element of αn is distributed i.i.d according to the cdf G
which is bounded on the interval [0, 1] (meaning G(1) = 1) and has a pdf g
which is continuous and strictly positive3.
In market Mn, the value of a coalition of firms and workers S is given by
v(S) = max
[
αni1j1 + α
n
i2j2
+ · · ·+ αniljl
]
,
where the maximum is taken over all arrangements of 2l distinct agents,
i1, . . . , il ∈ S ∩ F , j1, . . . , jl ∈ S ∩W , and l ≤ min {|S ∩ F | , |S ∩W |}. An
allocation is denoted by (µ, u, v) with µ being a matching of firms to workers
and vice-versa, and u and v being payoff vectors for the firms and workers
respectively. We will refer to u as firms’ “profits”, and to v as workers’
“salaries”. Formally, µ : F n ∪W n → F n ∪W n ∪ {∅}, and satisfies
1. ∀f ∈ F n : µ(f) ∈ W n ∪ {∅},
2. ∀w ∈ W n : µ(w) ∈ F n ∪ {∅}, and
3. ∀f ∈ F n, w ∈ W n : µ(f) = w ⇐⇒ µ(w) = f .
An allocation is a core allocation if no coalition can deviate and split the
resulting value between its members such that each member of the coalition
becomes strictly better off. We denote the set of core allocations of Mn
by C (Mn). Shapley and Shubik (1971) have shown that the core is a non-
empty compact and convex set, and that it is elongated in the sense that
there is a firm-optimal core allocation in which salaries are the lowest, and a
worker-optimal core allocation in which salaries are the highest.
3In fact for our our results to hold we just need that the pdf is continuous near its
supremum, and that it doesn’t depend on n. In addition, the results also hold if there
are atoms. Specifically, if there is an atom at the supremum of the distribution then whp
the surplus will be n times the supremum, there will be no wage dispersion, and in a
firm-optimal allocation all workers will get zero. Atoms at other places do not matter as
n goes to infinity.
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4 An approximate law of one price
Our main theorem states that the core is not only elongated, but also narrow,
in the sense that with high probability (i.e. with probability that approaches
1) firms’ profits and workers’ salaries do not vary a lot.
Theorem 1. There exists c ∈ R+ such that with probability at least 1 −
O
(
1
n
)
, for any (µ, u, v) ∈ C (Mn) we have
1. ∀i, j ∈ {1, . . . |F n|} : |ui − uj| ≤ c log2 nn , and
2. ∀i, j ∈ {1, . . . |W n|} : |vi − vj| ≤ c log2 nn .
Let G be a directed bipartite graph where firms are vertices of one side,
and workers are vertices on the other side. Each firm f points to the
32n+k(n)
n
log(n) workers it values the most, equivalently there is an edge (f, w)
if and only if
|{αf,j : αf,j ≥ αf,w}| ≤ 32n+ k(n)
n
log(n).
Note that since there are no ties in α the verbal definition coincides with the
mathematical one.
Each worker that is assigned points to the firm which hired her.
Claim 2. With probability at least 1 − 1/n, for any set of firms FS with
|FS | < n/10, we have that
|N(FS)| ≥ 2n+ k(n)
n
|FS |,
where N(S) is the set of neighbors of a set of vertices S. In addition, for
any set of firms |FS | of size n/10
|N(FS)| ≥ 0.99(n+ k(n)).
Proof. Consider a set of firms FS of size m < n/10, and a set of workers WS
of size η < 2n+k(n)
n
m. Since the edges coming out of FS point to independent
random workers, the probability that all edges point towards workers in WS
is at most (
η
n+ k(n)
) 32(n+k(n))m logn
n
.
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Taking a union bound over all sets of firms of size m, and all sets of workers
of size η, the probability that there is a set of firms of size m which points
to η < 2n+k(n)
n
m workers is upper bounded by
(
n
m
)(
n+ k(n)
η
)(
η
n+ k(n)
) 32(n+k(n))m logn
n
≤
(
2n
2n+k(n)
n
m
)2(2n+k(n)
n
m
n+ k(n)
) 32(n+k(n))m logn
n
=
(
2n
2n+k(n)
n
m
)2(
2m
n
) 32(n+k(n))m logn
n
≤(
2n
4m
)2(
2m
n
)32m log(n)
≤(
2ne
4m
)8m(
2m
n
)32m log(n)
≤ 1/n2,
where the second inequality uses 0 ≤ k(n) ≤ n, the third uses the fact that
m < n/10 and binomial coefficients increase until
(
2n
n
)
, and the fourth is an
approximation of the binomial coefficient.
Using m < n/10, we union bound over m, and get a failure probability
of at most 1/10n.
Similarly, let FS be a set of workers with |FS | = n/10. The probability
that all the workers they point to lie in a set of size at most 0.99(n+ k(n) is
(
n
n/10
)(
n+ k(n)
0.99(k(n) + n)
)(
0.99(n+ k(n))
n+ k(n)
)3.2n log(n)
=(
n
n/10
)(
n+ k(n)
0.01(k(n) + n)
)(
0.99(n+ k(n))
n+ k(n)
)3.2n log(n)
≤(
ne
n/10
)n/10(
(n+ k(n))e
(n+ k(n))/100
)(n+k(n))/100(
0.99(n+ k(n))
n+ k(n)
)3.2n log(n)
≤
(10e)n/10(100e)0.02n
(
1
100
)3n log(n)
≤ 1/n2,
which finishes the proof.
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If k(n) > n, we can prove the following stronger claim, via a similar
technique.
Claim 3. With probability at least 1− 1/n, for any set of firms FS , we have
that
|N(FS)| ≥ 2n+ k(n)
n
|FS |,
where N(S) is the set of neighbors of a set of vertices S.
For k(n) ≤ n, we also show a similar claim for workers, showing that for
any set of workers, the set of firms which point to them is large.
Claim 4. With probability at least 1− 1/n, for any set of workers WS with
|WS | < n/10, we have that
|{f : N(f) ∩WS 6= ∅}| ≥ 2|WS |.
Proof. Consider a set of workers WS of size m < n/10, and a set of firms
FS with |FS | = η < 2m. The probability that for every f 6∈ FS we have
N(f) ∩WS = ∅ is (
n+ k(n)−m
n+ k(n)
)32(n−η) log(n)
Taking a union bound over sets of workers and sets of firms, the probability
that there exists a set of workers of size m such that exactly η firms point to
it, with η < 2m is at most(
n+ k(n)
η
)(
n
n− η
)(
n+ k(n)−m
n+ k(n)
)32(n−η) log(n)
=(
n+ k(n)
η
)(
n
η
)(
1− m
n+ k(n)
)32(n−η) log(n)
≤(
2n
η
)2 (
1− m
2n
)32(n−η) log(n)
≤(
2n
2m
)2(
1− 1
2n
)16n log(n)
≤(
2ne
2m
)4m
e−8m log(n) ≤
(ne)4me−8m log(n) ≤
(ne)4m
(
1
n
)8m
≤ 1/n3.
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Taking a union bound over the values of m and η finishes the proof.
The following claim is the only place where we use the continuity of g,
the density of the distribution G used to sample α.
Claim 5. With probability 1 − 1/n, if firm f points to a worker w then
αf,w > 1− 512 log(n)g(1)n .
Proof. Let β = 32n+k(n)
n
log(n), let τ be such that G(τ) = 1 − 8β/(n +
k(n)) = 1− 256 log(n)
n
. The probability that out of n + k(n) samples, exactly
η < 32 log(n) of them would be above τ is(
n+ k(n)
η
)
(8β/(n+ k(n))η (1− 8β/(n+ k(n))(n+k(n)−η) ≤(
n+ k(n)
β
)
(8β/(n+ k(n))β (1− 8β/(n+ k(n))n+k(n)2 ≤(
e(n+ k(n))
β
)β
(8β/(n+ k(n))β (1− 8β/(n+ k(n))n+k(n)2 =
(8e)β (1− 8β/(n+ k(n))n+k(n)2 ≤
(8e)βe−4β =
e−(4−log 8)β < 1/n3.
Taking a union bound over all possible values of η < β and n firms gives the
result.
Since g is continuous, there is an interval [a, 1] in which g(x) ≥ g(1)/2.
We choose τ ≥ 1− 512 log(n)
g(1)n
.
We now use the graph and its properties to lower bound the profits of the
firms.
Claim 6. If a firm i points to worker that’s unemployed then ui ≥ 1 −
512 log(n)
g(1)n
. Moreover, if firm i points to a worker j, and j points to i′ then
ui ≥ u′i − 512 log(n)g(1)n .
Proof. If i points to j which is unemployed, i could hire j and pay her
nothing. Therefore, it must be that ui ≥ αi,j ≥ 1− 512 log(n)g(1)n .
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For the other case, i points to j, and j points to i′. since αni′,j ≤ 1, it
must be that vj ≤ 1− ui′ . But since it is an equilibrium
ui ≥ αni,j − vj ≥ αni,j − 1 + ui′ ≥ 1−
512 log(n)
g(1)n
− 1 + ui′ = ui′ − 512 log(n)
g(1)n
,
where we used Claim 5
Note that in particular if there is a path of length k from a firm i to a
firm i′ then ui ≥ u′i − ·k, and if there is a path of length k from firm i to an
unemployed worker than ui ≥ 1− 512 log(n)g(1)n k.
Proof of Theorem 1. Consider any core outcome and two firms i, i′. We want
to show that ui ≥ ui′ − 1024 log
2(n)
g(1)n
.
Let S1 = N(i) be the set of workers which i points to. If there is w ∈ S1
such that µ(w) = ∅, then by Claim 6 ui ≥ αi,w ≥ 1 − 512 log(n)g(1)n , and since
uj ≤ 1, we are done.
If for every w ∈ S1 we have µ(w) 6= ∅, then |N(S1)| = |S1|. In this
case, let S2 = N (N(S1)), and by Claim 2 (or Claim 3 if k(n) > n) we have
|S2| ≥ 2 · |S1|. If there is w ∈ S2 such that µ(w) = ∅, there is a path of length
2 to an unemployed worker, and ui ≥ 1− 1024 log(n)g(1)n .
Continuing this by induction, if for some w ∈ Sk we have µ(w) = ∅ then
ui ≥ 1 − k 512 log(n)g(1)n . Otherwise, we define Sk+1 = N (N(Sk)), and get that
|Sk+1| ≥ 2|Sk|. If k(n) > n, We continue with this process until we get to an
unemployed worker and we are done in log(n) steps.
If k(n) ≤ n, we can continue for at most log(n)− 3 steps, after which we
would be left with a set of firms FS of size n/8.
We now start with the target firm i′. There is a worker w that points to
it. According to Claim 4, there are at least two firms that point to w. Now
there are two workers who point to those firms, four firms that point to them,
etc. We continue this for log(n)−4 steps until we get to a set of workersWS
of size at least n/16. However, invoking the second part of Claim 2, the set
FS points to at least 0.99(n+k(n)) workers, and since |WS | > 0.01(n+k(n))
by the pigeonhole principle there is an edge from FS to WS , and a path of
length at most 2 log(n)− 6 from i to i′, which implies the theorem for firms.
We now show the second part of the theorem, namely that workers get
similar salaries. If the market is balanced (k(n) = 0), we can apply the same
argument. Else, let w be a worker, and we show that vw ≤ 1024 log
2(n)
g(1)n
. If w
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is unemployed then vw = 0 and we are done. Else, let f be the firm which
hires w.
If k(n) > n, the firm f has a path of length log(n) to an unemployed
worker and therefore uf ≥ 1− 512 log
2(n)
g(1)n
and therefore vw ≤ 512 log2 nn .
If k(n) ≤ n, let w′ be an unemployed worker, which has a firm f ′ pointing
to it. Since for k(n) ≥ n, any two firms have a path of length at most
2 log(n)− 6 between them we have
uf ≥ uf ′ − (2 log(n)− 6)512 log(n)
g(1)n
,
and since f ′ points to an unemployed worker uf ′ ≥ 1− 512 log(n)g(1)n . Therefore
uf ≥ 1 − (2 log(n) − 4)512 log(n)g(1)n . But since uf + vw ≤ 1, it must be that
vw ≤ 1024 log
2(n)
g(1)n
as required.
5 Applications
5.1 Balanced markets
We first deal with the case of k(n) ≡ 0. In this case we will show that whp the
firm-optimal core allocation gives almost all the surplus to the firms. From
symmetry this will imply that the core is “long” in the sense that different
market mechanisms can lead to very different divisions of the surplus.
Corollary 7. In a balanced market, with probability 1 − O ( 1
n
)
, under the
firm-optimal core allocation the workers’ share of the surplus is O
(
log2(n)
n
)
.
Proof. Under the firm-optimal core allocation at least one worker must get
exactly 0 (or else we can substract some small  > 0 from each worker’s salary
and remain with a new core allocation which is even better for the firms).
Theorem 1 then immediately implies that the sum of workers’ salaries is
O( log
2(n)
n
), whereas routine arguments from the theory of random assignment
problems prove that the total surplus is n− o(n).
For the benchmark case of uniform distribution we can also provide tight
bounds for the sum of workers’ salaries under the firm-optimal core alloca-
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tion.4
Theorem 8. In a balanced market with uniform distributions, G = U [0, 1],
let ψF (Mn) =
(
µF,n, uF,n, vF,n
)
be the firm-optimal core allocation. Then
1. E
[∑
i∈{1,...,n} v
F,n
i
]
≤ log(n), and
2. E
[∑
i∈{1,...,n} v
F,n
i
]
= Ω (log(n)).
Proof. For the upper bound, consider a variant of the approximation algo-
rithm suggested by Crawford and Knoer (1981) to solve a generalized version
of the assignment game, in which firms are ordered from 1 to n, and at each
round only the lowest-number firm that still wants to propose actually pro-
poses. What is the expected number of proposals between the first proposal
of firm k and the first proposal of firm k + 1? Assume that it is now firm
f ’s turn to propose, and its previous aspiration level (i.e. the maximal utility
it would get by giving some worker her current salary) was ui. If for some
unmatched w ∈ W n we have αnf,w ∈ [u − , u) then firm f will propose to
that worker within at most k rounds (or otherwise it will temporarily match
to some other worker and be replaced by another proposing firm). Therefore
the probability not proposing to some unmatched worker is above below by
1− (1− )n−k+1 ≈ (n− k + 1),
and so the expected number of steps until the first proposal of firm k + 1
is at most 1
(n−k+1) , and the the expected raise in workers’ salaries is
1
n−k+1 .
Summing over k we get that the expected sum of workers’ salaries is at most
1 +
1
2
+ · · ·+ 1
n− 1 +
1
n
≈ log(n).
For the lower bound a similar exercise can be taken, but taking into account
that whp all workers’ temporary salaries never exceed 1− c log2(n)
n
. The details
of the proof are omitted.
4In fact, the same proof strategy works, with minor modifications, for any distribution
with continuous and strictly positive density. Furthermore, it also applies to unbalanced
markets in which the number of firms is smaller than the number of workers.
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5.2 Unbalanced markets
The same reasoning that works for balanced markets can be applied to unbal-
anced markets. Our next result states that even slightly unbalanced markets
are likely to give all the surplus to the short side.
Corollary 9. In an unbalanced market, with probability 1 − O ( 1
n
)
, under
any core allocation all agents on the long side get O
(
log2(n)
n
)
, and the long
side’s share of the surplus is O
(
log2(n)
n
)
as well.
Proof. Immediate from Theorem 1 and the fact that under any core allocation
at least one agent on the long side remains unmatched.
6 Simulations
While the bound established in Theorem 1 converges to zero quite rapidly,
it is still worth while to see how powerful is the phenomenon described. In-
deed, as we stress in the concluding section, we expect the wage dispersion
to behave like O
(
log(n)
n
)
. In this section we present results of computerized
simulations that demonstrate how quick is the contraction of payoffs’ dis-
persion, and how this affects the market. We then use more simulations to
explore payoff dispersion in the presence of unbounded distributions. Each
figure is based on averaging 400 trials for each data point.
We first focus on the benchmark case of uniform [0, 1] distribution, and
study wage dispersion in balanced markets under the firm-optimal core allo-
cation. The right panel of Figure 1 shows that in this case both the mean
salary of workers and the maximum salary any worker gets (which is also the
maximal difference between any two workers’ salaries) approach zero very
quickly. The left panel of the same figure exemplifies the fact that the core
in balanced markets is long, as suggested by Theorem 7.
In unbalanced markets we expect the core to be much more narrow, per
Theorem 9. The left panel of Figure 2 shows that when the number of
workers is only slightly larger than the number of firms, both the workers’
mean salary and the maximum salary any worker gets, approach zero rapidly,
even under the worker-optimal core allocation. Furthermore, as the right
panel demonstrates, in this case the workers’ share in the surplus approaches
0, even under the worker-optimal core allocation. Finally, Figure 3 parallels
13
Figure 1: Balanced markets (n firms, n workers), distribution: U [0, 1]
Figure 4 of Ashlagi et al. (2013), and depicts workers’ share of the surplus
when the number of workers is constant at 50, and the number of firms varies
from 20 to 80.
Figure 2: Unbalanced markets (n firms, n+ 1 workers), distribution: U [0, 1]
6.1 Unbounded distributions
A very interesting question is what happens to our results when the distri-
bution G is unbounded. A rough intuition for this case is that unbounded
distributions with a heavy tail may create two types of outliers in the market.
“Good” outliers are agents that are highly productive compared to others,
such that agents from the other side fiercely compete on being matched with
them. These agents share a significant portion of the surplus they help cre-
ate, and if they are common enough, they may offset other forces that would
otherwise squeeze the surplus from their side (such as an adversarial core al-
location, or slight imbalance in favor of the other side of the market). “Bad”
outliers are agents that are so unproductive in comparison with their peers,
that being matched with them becomes the effective reservation value for
14
Figure 3: Unbalanced markets (50 workers), distribution: U [0, 1]
agents on the other side. If for any reason there are many such agents on one
of the sides, then the residual market behaves as if it was unbalanced, and
even mildly productive agents that are on the same side as the less-productive
agents earn a sizable part of their contribution to the total surplus.
Figure 4 describes workers’ salaries in a balanced market governed by two
distributions: Exponential and Weibull with parameter 0.25 (a heavy-tailed
distribution). As expected, we can see that the maximal salary does not go
to 0, and behaves more like log(n). In Figure 5 we can see the workers’ share
in the total surplus for the same markets.
Figure 4: Balanced markets, workers’ salaries
We conclude this section by noting that it is relatively easy to establish
analytically that Theorem 1 does not hold for the case of an exponential
distribution:
Proposition 10. If G is the exponential distribution and the market is bal-
anced and governed by the firm-optimal core allocation, then whp there are
two workers i and j such that |vi − vj| = Ω (log(n)).
15
Figure 5: Balanced markets, workers’ share of surplus
Proof. Let pn denote the probability that for a given firm f ∈ F n there exists
a worker w ∈ W n such that αnf,w > 1.1 log(n) and maxw′∈Wn\{w} αnf,w′ <
log(n). Then
p = n · e−1.1 log(n) · (1− e− log(n))n−1 = 1
n0.1
·
(
1− 1
n
)n−1
≈ 1
en0.1
.
This specifically implies that whp there are Ω (n0.8−) firms that meet the
above condition. If any of those two firms happen to have the same worker
being the outlier, then this worker must get paid at least 0.1 log(n) under any
core allocation. Since there are Ω (n1.6−2) pairs, then we get that there are
many workers that get paid Θ (log(n)). Finally, at least one worker’s salary
is 0 under the firm-optimal core allocation, and so we are done.
6.2 The role of outliers
To give some intuition to the way wage dispersion looks, and to the role
of “Good” and “Bad” outliers, Figure 6 presents the wage distribution of
workers in a single instance of a firm-optimal balanced markets (n = 1000).
In the left pane, G is the uniform distribution, while in the right pane G is
the exponential distribution.
It is not surprising that salaries are higher in the exponential distribution,
and that the total surplus is higher. Two other conclusions one can draw
are:
1. The wage distribution in the uniform distribution is balanced, where
in the exponential distribution it has a tail to the right
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Figure 6: Balanced markets, workers’ salaries
2. Although the wages in the exponential distribution have a tail, it is not
heavy, and most of the salary comes from the majority of the population
(there is no 1% which takes the economic pie). We see this as evidence
that the contribution to the workers’ salaries come from the existence
of “Bad” outliers and their effect on the population.
In Figure 6 it is hard to see the effect that “Bad” outliers have in the
uniform distribution. To better understand the effect, Figure 7 depicts the
relationship between the sum of salaries of the workers in a firm-optimal
outcome, and the quality of the “Worst” workers. The left pane shows the
the dependency of the sum of salaries on the quality of the “Worst” worker
(minimum over workers of the maximum value that worker has with a firm),
and is based on 100 trials with n = 100. In the right pane, we present the
effect of the second “Worst” worker. To this end, we sampled 100 random
markets, for which the quality of the worst worker was 0.95 ± 0.00001, and
depicted the dependency of the sum of salaries in the second “Worst” worker.5
Two observations about the graphs are
1. The dependency between the total salary and the quality of the worst
worker becomes linear (with a slope of n) as the quality of the worker
becomes lower. The reason is that it serves as a “reservation value” for
the market, and reducing its quality by  increases (almost) all wages
by (almost) . We note that when the quality of the worst worker is
5We did rejection sampling, that is we sampled random markets, and kept them if the
quality of the worst worker was between 0.94999 and 0.95001. This required us around a
million samples.
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Figure 7: Balanced markets (n firms, n workers), distribution: U [0, 1]
high, sometimes other workers serve as reservation value, and therefore
the slope is not linear.
2. The second “Worst” worker also has a linear effect on the market,
although here it is not as prominent.
We note that fitting the first graph to a linear approximation gives an
R2 value of 0.48, and an R2 value of 0.07 for the second graph. The second
highest value of the “Worst” worker also has an effect on the market. We
conjecture that the sum of salaries that the workers get is greatly affected
by the log(n) “Worst” workers.
We also note that the quality of the “Worst” firm (minimum over the
firms of the maximal value this firm has with a worker) has little effect on
the sum of salaries the workers get.
7 Conclusion
As hinted in the introduction, there is an abundance of real-world data sug-
gesting that not only does wage inequality exist, but that it persists across
nations, industries and even within firms (see, e.g. Mortensen (2005) and ref-
erences therein). While investment and variation in human capital explain
a significant portion of the differences in income, there are residual discrep-
ancies that are not so easily explained. Economists have considered many
possible approaches to this issue (for example, compensating differentials,
motivating effort, complementarities, search frictions, and more) and usually
carried an analysis under extremely restrictive assumptions on match value
heterogeneity. Our contribution provides tools that may allow interacting
those explanations within a more realistic framework.
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To give but two examples, our model inherently allows for compensating
differentials (by changing reservations values and then applying the analysis),
and it is relatively straightforward to add human capital or quality of firms,
as long as the production function is separable in those two factors. If,
say, workers’ quality is captured by a linear (common) contribution to each
element in the relevant column, it is easy to show that each worker will get
its contribution above the lowest type, and the rest of the surplus will be
distributed according to similar principles to those described in this paper.
Non-separable production function (that is, complementarities) require more
work because the proof must take into account that assortative matching will
take place to some extent (see also below).
There are several open questions that present future challenges for our
model. The first is providing a tighter bound on wage dispersion. The proof
of Theorem 1 used the upper log(n)
n
fraction in order to create an expander,
and used it to find paths between different firms. One could try to do so based
on the upper c
n
fraction, and try to get the correct bound of log(n)
n
. There
are a couple of obstacles to this approach. The first, is that for some firms
using the top c
n
edges would already create a loss of log(n)
n
(see Claim 5).
A potentially bigger obstacle is that the edges from workers to firms are
not random, and are chosen by the allocation. Our proof treats them as
adversarial, but this requires us to use more edges from firms to workers (see
Claim 4).
A different direction is studying the induced salary distribution for the
exponential distribution and for general unbounded distributions. As men-
tioned in Section 6, unbounded distributions call for new intuitions that
may offset the current analysis, and studying them is interesting. Specifi-
cally for the exponential distribution, we believe that the sum of workers’
salaries in a balanced market governed by the firm-optimal core allocation is
Θ (n log (log(n))). The (rough) intuition is that the min max over the produc-
tivity matrix’ entries behaves like log(n) − log (log(n)), whereas solving the
assignment problem would give a mean surplus of log(n). Moreover, in expec-
tation only n
log(n)
of the agents would have a value above log(n)+log(log(n)),
and since the maximal value in the matrix is 2 log(n) their total salary can
not exceed 2n.6
Finally, it is also interesting to analyze correlated random matrices. As
6The procedure used in the proof of Theorem 10 only used the “good” outliers, and we
think that most of the salary comes due to the existence of bad outliers - see Figure 6.
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mentioned above, adding correlation can significantly distort some of our re-
sults. Adding separable noise with agent-specific mean can easily be dealt
with, however interaction variables (such as Cobb-Douglas production func-
tion) are more tricky. With sufficient agents, we can get near-efficiency on
both dimensions (the common element and the pair-specific productivity),
but determining who gets what is more involved.
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